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 Communities struggling with a legacy of nuclear waste are often connected to weapons 
development. Whether it is Hanford in the United States or Mayak in Russia, the rushed 
production at such sites led to simple disposal schemes, releasing large quantities of radioactive 
material. Hanford acted as a “company town”, in which the actions of the facility and its 
contractors were not to be questioned. Additionally, the limited research on the environmental 
impact of radiation was rarely shared between Hanford and other Manhattan Project sites, 
leading to a culture of hurried decisions with little consideration as to their broader impact.  
  The plutonium found in nuclear weapons, plutonium-239, has a half-life of 24,100 
years.1 Its production requires the bombardment of uranium-235 atoms by a barrage of neutrons 
generated by the decay of other uranium-235 atoms. Only a portion of the uranium in a pile will 
decay into plutonium-239. The mixture of untouched uranium-235, plutonium-239, and many 
other daughter products must then be chemically processed to yield tiny amounts of plutonium, 
resulting in the creation of massive quantities of radioactive waste.2 
 The race to create and use atomic weapons led to difficult cost-benefit calculations. With 
the United States facing an existential threat, nearly any action could be justified through the fog 
of war. Urgency drove decision-making. The environmental cost was not the Army’s priority. 
Army brass needed a site that could cope with the environmental consequences of supporting 
plutonium production reactors. It needed a desolate landscape, access to water, electricity, and 
geographic isolation from high-population areas. That, the Army reasoned, would limit the 
collateral damage. 
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 When Army brass chose Hanford as the site for its production reactors to support the 
atomic weapons program, it saw a vast expanse of scrubland nestled along the Columbia River. 
In this place, where they saw nothing, they would create a vibrant community of engineers, 
scientists, and professionals. The Army would also attempt to erase the indigenous people and 
farmers who called the area home for decades.3 
 The damage caused by the site is long-lived. Since the final reactor went offline in 1987, 
environmental concerns have abounded. The cost of remaining cleanup is projected to be $9 
billion per year at peak cost and the cleanup will continue until 2078. The low-range total 
estimate for the remaining cleanup is $323.2 billion.4 The high-end estimate is $677 billion. The 
slow seepage of wastes dumped on the Hanford site, the poor record-keeping at the site, and the 
potential for catastrophic events continue to lengthen the timeline. By the current estimated 
timetable, the cleanup will take generations, if not longer. But Hanford does not stand alone. 
Defense-based weapons facilities in the United States have contaminated approximately 40 
million acres of land (an area slightly larger than the state of Florida).5 Hanford is just one 
example of a much larger problem. 
 The Hanford site’s wartime origins shaped its environmental legacy. The primary motive 
of production over caution led to shortcomings in safety considerations, with the lack of 
foresight also stemming from a broader culture of workplace safety that existed in the 1940s. 
Though the first contractor, DuPont, prioritized worker safety, it did so with limited scientific 
information from other Manhattan Project sites. This lack of information in turn caused DuPont 
to utilize questionable disposal methods under the assumption that dilution of radioactive 
                                                          
3 Bruce and Hevly, 15-25 
4 2019 Hanford Scope, Schedule, and Cost Report, P-1 
5 Lustgarten, 2017 
4 
 
particles with another solution would reduce the environmental impact of radioactive emissions. 
These methods included: venting airborne radioisotopes into the atmosphere, dispersing 
radioactive particles in the Columbia River, and dumping diluted chemical wastes onto and into 
the ground. These central factors, the production motive, limited scientific information about the 
impact of radiation, and the workplace safety culture of the 1940s, all resulted in the release of 
significant levels of radioactivity both over the lifetime of the facility and long after its 
decommissioning. The site also deeply impacted the nearby communities of Richland, Pasco, 
and Kennewick, forming a science and engineering-oriented company town. 
 
World War II Production 
The story of Hanford begins with World War II. The United States believed itself to be in 
a deadly race with Germany to build the atomic bomb. On September 18, 1942, General Leslie 
Groves was given the charge of overseeing the Manhattan Engineer District, or the Manhattan 
Project.6 Groves immediately pushed for the acquisition of a site in Oak Ridge, Tennessee to 
process uranium and directed Dr. Robert Oppenheimer to find a suitable site in the southwest for 
building and testing a bomb.7 Groves also directed a team led by Colonel Franklin Matthias to 
search for a site to refine uranium into plutonium due to its potential use in another type of 
atomic bomb.8  
 Col. Matthias began his search near the Grand Coulee area in Washington state along the 
Columbia River. The area was attractive not only for the easy accessibility of cold water to cool 
the refinery, but also due to the abundance of hydroelectricity nearby to power water pumps and 
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other machinery.9 When Matthias’ team looked at the Hanford site in eastern Washington, they 
quickly discovered the region’s benefits: the area was sparsely-populated, provided easy access 
to gravel on-site for rapid building, and provided seclusion for a top-secret matter of national 
security.10 The army announced that it would condemn nearly 3,000 tracts of land owned by 
approximately 2,000 individuals in February 1943, thus creating the Hanford Reservation. The 
federal government only permitted them 30 days to leave and provided the minimum amount of 
compensation necessary to secure the land. 
 With the site in hand, the federal government needed an experienced contractor to 
oversee production. Eventually, Gen. Groves tapped DuPont Chemical to oversee the new 
facility. Within their contract, DuPont instituted a corporate payscale for its employees due to 
fears that the company could not attract skilled laborers and engineers.11 Their fears would later 
be proven true: Matthias reported that the early phases of the project were characterized by a 
monthly employee turnover rate of 10 percent.12 DuPont’s experience as a weapons 
manufacturer also informed its safety practices, which relied upon keeping the facilities a safe 
distance from inhabited areas.13 
 The Hanford Engineering Works were meticulously planned with the plutonium 
production cycle in mind. The three production reactors, B, D, and F consisted of the same basic 
plan: a grid of graphite bricks with holes bored down the middle (see Figure 1 on next page).14 
The holes held uranium fuel rods (uranium pellets encased in aluminum), control rods (to 
regulate the speed of the chain reaction), or safety rods (designed to halt the chain reaction). 
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Once the fuel was spent, it was pushed out of the back of the graphite matrix into a pool of water 
to cool. After cooling sufficiently, the fuel was taken by a remote mechanical device to chemical 
separation facilities, where the plutonium was dissolved from unconverted portions of the fuel 
rod.15 This stage presented the greatest overall environmental risk due to the impact various 
solvents had upon the adsorption rates of various radioactive byproducts.16 The effluent, or 
cooling water, produced by the Hanford “100 area” was held for a short amount of time before 
being returned to the Columbia River (see Figure 1 for a reference map). This water was filled 
with over 60 different radionuclides. 
Figure 1: Basic Design of B, D, and F Reactors 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the basic design of the original plutonium production reactors at Hanford. These were clustered 
in the 100-area of the reservation (see Figure 2). 
Linking Legacies: Connecting the Cold War Nuclear Weapons Production Processes to their Environmental 
Consequences. 1997. United States: Department of Energy. 164. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/003180782. 
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Figure 2: Map of the Site 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates the main difficulty facing DuPont and the Army Corps of Engineers: controlling large-scale 
operations across a massive area. Note: The original boundaries of the reservation are in yellow. 
Williams, Mark, Brad Fritz, Donaldo Mendoza, Mark Rockhold, Paul Thorne, Yulong Xie, Bruce Bjornstad, et al. 
2008. Interim Report: 100NR2 Apatite Treatability Test: Low Concentration Calcium Citrate-Phosphate Solution 




 The war characterized the creation of the Hanford facility: speed was paramount. The 
rapid pace of building paved the way for hasty decisions. The damage to the site began with 
demolition of the existing farms and infrastructure. Though Hanford was already a desolate 
landscape, the Army Corps of Engineers exacerbated the problem. The Corps bulldozed the 
landscape flat, removed the topsoil, and replaced it with silt from the Yakima River.17 According 
to a scientist moving to the area, “When the wind blew[,] you wouldn’t be able to see across the 
street.”18 Late in 1943, Col. Matthias gave orders to the government’s contractor, DuPont, to 
install water treatment safeguards on the second reactor, but not the first to allow the first reactor 
to begin plutonium production.19 The breakneck pace of building was then concentrated on the 
amenities needed to lower the staff turnover rate.20 The entire project was viewed through the 
prism of war and production. 
  The first production reactor to be completed, B reactor, was built in 15 months from June 
1943 to September 1944.21 The Hanford Engineering Works would gain two additional reactors 
and two chemical reprocessing plants by February 1945. All three reactors were simultaneously 
running at their designed power levels by March 18, 1945. In anticipation of a Nazi surrender, 
the Army and DuPont kept up a barrage of propaganda to maintain the frenzied pace of 
production and deploy the bomb before the end of the war.22 Hanford produced its first shipment 
of fissionable material on February 2, 1945. It produced the quantities of plutonium necessary for 
both the Trinity nuclear test and the ‘Fat Man’ bomb in a span of approximately 7 months. 
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Waste: Early Concerns and Long-Term Trends 
 From the beginning of the project, DuPont and the Army expressed concerns over the 
waste produced at Hanford. An early memo from DuPont in 1942 estimated that the production 
of one gram of plutonium would result in 8,000 gallons of “hot” material.23 The Army 
commissioned studies to determine if winds would dilute and carry away dangerous atmospheric 
emissions. A subordinate of Gen. Groves, Lt. Col. Kenneth D. Nichols, wrote of the study: 
“Decision relative to acquiring the site is held up pending results of the meteorology study being 
made by Dr. Compton's group. Upon the completion of this study, DuPont will make its 
recommendation and the site will be acquired” (emphasis added).24 Under pressure from Groves 
and the Army, scientists conducting the study determined that the production schedule could be 
coordinated with wind patterns, lessening the overall concern.25 Instead, plant operators pushed 
to meet the delivery schedule for Los Alamos, speeding up the process by making atmospheric 
releases when the winds were poor and failing to let fuel rods cool for the correct amount of 
time. The result was that Hanford routinely released radiation well in excess of the calculated 
maximum of one curie per day set by Hanford’s chief health physicist, Herbert Parker.26 The 
chemical separation facilities in Hanford’s 200-area primarily released iodine-131, releasing 
420,000 curies of radiation in the first two years of operation (an average of more than 500 curies 
per day). Iodine-131 is dangerous due to its affinity for bonding inside human and animal thyroid 
tissue, where it can cause cancer. 
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 The surrounding area quickly showed signs of contamination from radioisotopes of 
iodine-131 and similar emissions. The chemical dissolution of the first fuel charge resulted in an 
emission of 1,700 curies (composed of radioactive xenon and iodine) being released into the 
atmosphere.27 In spring of 1945, DuPont began to track deposits of these emissions near the 
stacks and inside the chemical processing facilities, with some radioactive deposits peaking at 
more than 100 times the acceptable value. DuPont began conducting thyroid checks to track 
worker inhalation of iodine-131. The emissions were not just being deposited over a great 
distance. Instead, they were also being concentrated on-site. Contaminated vegetation was found 
nearly 70 miles away in Walla Walla and Pendleton by December 1945.28 In response, and due 
to the decreased demand for production following the Japanese surrender, DuPont increased the 
cooling time for spent fuel rods, thereby decreasing the emissions of radioactive byproducts into 
the atmosphere. This held until 1949, when the first Soviet atomic explosion inspired the “Green 
Run” experiment at Hanford. In the experiment, a plume of radioactive isotopes was released and 
tracked across the landscape to help calculate estimated Soviet production.29 The Soviet test 
caused production to increase once more. 
 Though strides were being made to limit atmospheric emissions, little was initially done 
to prevent radioisotopes from entering the Columbia river and being carried downstream. The 
first eight reactors built from 1943 to 1955 were designed as “single pass” systems, intaking 
water from the Columbia to cool the reactor, holding it for a few hours, and discharging it into 
the river.30 Since little data on the impact of radiological emissions on aquatic ecosystems 
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existed, the Army commissioned a study with the help of Dr. Lauren Donaldson of the 
University of Washington.31 Early findings in 1946 indicated that radioactive isotopes were 
concentrated within fish at a level from 6 to 30 times greater than the water.32 Of the young fish 
raised in effluent from the reactors, nearly 99 percent died. In December 1946, scientists 
estimated that nearly 40,000 curies of radiation had entered the Columbia River (peaking at 900 
curies per day in summer 1945). Further studies illustrated the biological magnification problem 
in the Columbia: even plankton and algae concentrated radioactive isotopes at a factor more than 
2,000 times that of the river water.33  
The first Soviet test in 1949 brought with it a new era of production and increased waste. 
River radioactivity entered a new phase in 1950. Channeling effects concentrated radioactive 
isotopes in ever changing-areas along the river. The beta radiation measured at the Richland 
Dock (an area with the largest population in the surrounding area) doubled from the year prior.34 
As the Cold War intensified and plutonium production increased, so too did the levels of 
radiation introduced to the water. By 1952, the radioactivity levels measured in the effluent were 
20 times the amount measured in 1947.35 This corresponded with decreased effluent holding 
times. In 1945, the Hanford Engineering Works held effluent for eight hours on average, 
providing enough time for radioisotopes with shorter half-lives to decay. By 1946, effluent 
would be held for 4 to 6 hours. By 1960, effluent holding times would be a mere 30 minutes to 3 
hours, releasing nearly the full amount of short-lived isotopes of concern (namely arsenic-76 and 
phosphorus-32).36 These practices resulted in steadily-increasing levels of radiation from August 
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1957 to 1959, climbing at a rate of nearly 4,000 curies per day. By 1963, the average release rate 
of beta emitters had climbed to 14,500 curies per day. 
 The final vector for radiological contamination occurred via groundwater. The long-term 
storage of Hanford’s high-level wastes posed the lowest risk. Instead, the most significant risk to 
groundwater came from the deliberate use of injection wells and “open-bottomed” holes/cribs to 
“store” large quantities of acidic radioactive wastes from the chemical processing facilities at the 
200-area.37 Scientists at Hanford believed this practice to be safe due to ion exchange between 
the soil and wastes. This practice resulted in the following radionuclides being present in 
Hanford’s groundwater (in addition to several others): strontium-89 and 90, cobalt-60, cesium-
137, plutonium-239, and iodine-129 (which has a half-life of several million years). The use of 
cribs, or ditches, was of early concern. The practice of allowing wastes to evaporate at ground 
level meant that winds could pick up the dried waste and disperse it.38 Reverse wells (dry shafts 
with holes at the bottom) were used to prevent the creation of surface deposits but placed wastes 
in immediate contact with groundwater. A U.S. Geological Survey study of Hanford found that 
wastes from the chemical processing facility slowly inched toward the Columbia River.39 
 
Origins and Context of Disposal Methods 
 The choice of DuPont as the first contractor at Hanford would inform the facility’s 
disposal practices and safety procedures for years to come. DuPont’s prior experience in 
munitions and chemical processing influenced its choices and priorities. Common practice in the 
1940s and 1950s was to develop disposal methods through “an amalgam of science and 
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engineering mixed with heavy doses of convenience and expediency.”40 With the added pressure 
of wartime, DuPont and the Army failed to conduct early research on the relationship between 
radiation and the natural world, opting instead to prioritize the health and safety of its workers 
over the broader ecological effects of radiation upon the environment.41 DuPont failed to see the 
broader impact of its disposal schemes. 
 Outwardly, Hanford was evaluated to be a simple ecosystem primarily composed of 
scrubland. By the Army’s evaluation, the land was “practically worthless.”42 The site’s 
remoteness justified the lack of care given to disposal methods. DuPont and the Army focused 
upon tracking the danger posed by radiation to workers at the jobsites and imposing strict 
limitations on exposure.43 To achieve these limits, it was believed that the impact of radiation 
could be lessened through dilution, primarily accomplished through introducing radioisotopes to 
air or water. Management’s focus upon worker safety and misguided belief in dilution as a cure-
all resulted in disposal policies that produced the largest releases of radioactivity across the 
history of the site.44 
 DuPont designers were most short-sighted in the disposal schemes they devised for the 
byproducts of chemical separation after the fuel was recovered from the reactor. It elected to 
store corrosive byproducts (a combination of bismuth phosphate, uranium, and other 
radioisotopes) in steel containers capped by concrete due to steel shortages during the war.45 The 
plans only provided enough of these tanks to store a year’s supply of byproducts. Additionally, 
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the tanks only held the most dangerous byproducts. The overwhelming majority of the chemical 
baths used to dissolve the aluminum casings around fuel slugs were deposited in the ground 
around the 200-area.46 The institutional habits created by these large-scale policies would be 
slow to change. 
 Such protection schemes did little to protect workers. In part, this stemmed from the 
institutional directive given to the Medical Section within the Manhattan Project. According to 
Hymer Friedell, the division’s chief medical officer, “the services of the medical organization are 
an accessory function. The primary interest is to maintain the health of the operators at a level 
which will in no way interfere with operations.”47 As such, military brass directed the scientists 
of the Medical Section to perform studies that would protect the Army from legal action.48 When 
DuPont inquired into the results of impact studies, the Army routinely deflected. Ultimately, 
DuPont established its own research program focused upon the impact of Hanford upon the 
ecology of the Columbia River.49 While DuPont began researching the ecological impact of 
radiation and ways to minimize its impact, the Army began researching secondary uses for the 
Hanford waste in weapons.50 The Army was well aware of the potential impact of radioactive 
waste, but the siloed nature of information in the Manhattan Project meant that DuPont 
executives would remain in the dark. 
 Despite such shortcomings, Hanford and its overseers in DuPont were viewed as overly 
cautious in respect to safety measures. A regime change would ultimately upend the comparative 
culture of caution promoted by DuPont. After the war, Methods division head Herbert Parker 
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was criticized by Los Alamos scientists for the sensitivity of the methods used to detect 
contamination of workers by plutonium.51 This sense of relative conservatism was not without 
boundaries. In 1947, radioactive particles were found on the ground near the 200-area stacks. 
Attempts to control the dispersal of radioactive particles on the reservation with new ductwork 
and sand filters appeared promising until new data illustrated that particles were traveling as far 
away as Spokane.52 Parker ceased dissolving operations in the 200-area on October 25, 1948. 
The Atomic Energy Commission, which gained control of federal activities at Hanford in 1947, 
only permitted this to continue for six weeks before production resumed. The habits had been 
set. 
 
A Company Town: Social Impact 
 
 From the start, Hanford reshaped the surrounding communities of Richland, Pasco, and 
Kennewick. A community of farmers was razed to the ground to make way for the facility. In its 
stead, DuPont built company houses in nearby Richland to support the scientists and engineers 
needed to staff the site.53 As a result, Richland was a “model community” built to serve white, 
middle-class engineers, administrators, and operators.54 Matthias instructed DuPont to set rental 
rates high to discourage laborers from living in the town.55 Due to its production goals, the Army 
did not want to risk racial conflict. Richland’s planning was the product of compromise between 
economic efficiency and DuPont’s vision of middle-class life.56 The town plan was balanced 
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between boosting morale and minimizing cost. The Army and DuPont reversed roles when 
considering how Richland would be operated. The Army believed that more social services were 
necessary to support residents while DuPont intended to place its corporate culture on the 
town.57 
 By contrast, the Hanford Camp was constructed for laborers and their families. Due to the 
labor shortage, its population included African American and Hispanic workers.58 This minority-
based community was inherited by Pasco and Kennewick after the temporary Hanford Camp was 
dismantled in 1945. Hispanic and African American populations mostly lived in a now-crowded 
Pasco, the only nearby city in which they could be housed.59 The federal government had 
assumed that the small towns near the project could provide essential services necessary to 
maintain construction and production. Instead, Col. Matthias soon noted that the project had 
placed an “unbearable load on the facilities, both social and law-enforcing, of the Pasco area.”60 
 The site altered the fabric of the surrounding communities. It brought a group of 
scientists and engineers as well as African American and Hispanic laborers. The early site was 
also characterized by a lack of autonomy for Richland; the town had no local elections or local 
government.61 However, this was out of necessity, as the communities of Richland and the other 
Tri-Cities were not self-sustaining, relying heavily upon funding from the federal government. In 
1948, General Electric and the Atomic Energy Commission hired a firm to create a new master 
plan for Richland. This plan was adhered to due to the town’s lack of “politics as usual”.62 
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 The facility also shaped the new scientific community it created, as is evident in the early 
career of William Bair. William Bair received his undergraduate degree in chemistry from Ohio 
Wesleyan University. On a whim, he applied to the University of Rochester for a graduate 
degree in radiological physics, where he became the first person to receive a PhD in radiation 
biology.63 Bair arrived in Richland in September 1954. After two years spent working on basic 
mutagenesis research (the mechanism by which radiation causes genetic changes), he was 
selected to run the inhalation toxicology lab at General Electric in 1956. 
 The inhalation toxicology lab was born out of the need for understanding the effects of 
inhalation of radiological materials on animals, particularly humans. Prior studies on the 
biological effects of plutonium in the body utilized injection as their form of delivery, a poor 
analog for inhalation. The Air Force contracted Bair’s division to study the effects of plutonium 
inhalation in beagle dogs. Bair found that dogs exposed to an aerosol of plutonium-239 oxide 
tended to retain plutonium-239 primarily in the lungs and excrete the plutonium at five times the 
rate of intravenous injection.64 Gradually, the plutonium moved to the lymph nodes, thus 
protecting the lungs from further harm. No evidence of cancer was found in the lymph nodes.  
 Hanford continued to be the catalyst for further radiobiological research. Bair mainly 
focused on developing biokinetic models for the distribution of radionuclides throughout the 
body (which organs are most impacted and the biological mechanisms of travel between 
organs).65 General Electric commissioned studies focused on the adsorption of plutonium in the 
digestive tract and explored the mechanisms for removing plutonium from the body 
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(“decorporation”). This line of research ultimately produced a drug, DTPA, to treat exposure to 
heavy radioactive elements (such as plutonium). 
 Bair’s story illustrates the profound impact of the Hanford reservation upon the 
communities around it. The entire scientific community came to Richland and the Tri-Cities with 
a distinct purpose: studying the impact of the new atomic frontier or aiding in its creation. That 
sense of purpose altered the essence of the Tri-Cities and directly influenced the decisions made 
by scientists and engineers like William Bair. His early focus upon inhalation toxicology and 
biokinetic models for the adsorption of radioactive material in the body were the direct legacy of 
the early waste disposal techniques used by DuPont and the contractors that followed. 
 
Conclusion 
 Hanford’s environmental legacy is the direct result of its wartime origins. The context of 
the war placed production as the primary focus above all else. Decision-making processes were 
also steeped in the workplace safety culture of the 1940s and 1950s, narrowing the scope of 
safety discussions. Attempts to make the facility safe did so with limited scientific information 
about the ecological impact of radiation and focused on providing the level of safety needed to 
ensure production. This informational deficit and organizational flaw led DuPont and future 
contractors to spew wastes into the air, send them into the Columbia River, and deposit them in 
the earth beneath the site.  
These disposal practices ultimately harmed the ecology of a significant geographical area 
and have necessitated a dangerous cleanup process that will take decades to complete. The 
cleanup process creates its own share of dangers. Though workers are monitored for exposure to 
radiation, they are also exposed to other toxins. The vapors emitted by the tank farms are known 
19 
 
to contain chemicals linked to brain and lung damage.66 The wellbeing of those cleaning up the 
facility is imperiled by the scope of the environmental damage. 
 Socially, Hanford created a new community of scientists and engineers. It also created 
three cities with deeply-engrained racial and class boundaries. The surrounding communities 
were financially-dependent on the site during its operation and continue to depend on it in the 
present day. These communities were built due to federal spending and rely on it to keep their 
citizens employed. Despite the hazards posed by the site, the Tri-Cities need Hanford. Without 
the site and its environmental impact, the area would be a simple farming community. Instead, it 
is a community forever marked by nuclear research. 
 Similar military sites have exposed countless Americans to toxic waste through disposal 
of munitions and other chemical compounds. The Pentagon estimates that nearly 40,000 known 
and suspected toxic sites exist on current and former Department of Defense properties.67 Their 
disposal schemes, particularly open burns, continue unabated. Like Hanford, we do not yet know 
the scale of their impact. Their current and future disposal practices will determine that scale. 
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